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Chapter Five  Conclusion 
 
This paper discussed the policymaking process of Japan’s first governmental loan to 
China in 1979 based on the two-stage framework derived from the policy approach. Taking 
the time of September 1979, when the China brought forward the official request to the 
Japanese government, as the segmentation point, the policymaking process could be 
divided into two stages, during which the two questions of “whether or not Japan would 
provide governmental loan to China” and “how to provide governmental loan to China” 
were decided respectively. The founding is that the two stages witnessed different patterns 
of decision-making mechanism with different actors as the dominant power. In the first 
stage, a small group of key figures in LDP and high-level bureaucrats played the central 
role and the mechanism was quite informal and flexible. The decision to provide economic 
assistance was based on the political judgment by taking into account all kinds of negative 
and positive factors, including the possible impacts on Japan’s relations with other foreign 
countries. This could be regarded as the rational actor pattern. In the second stage, the 
relevant bureaucratic institutions, especially the ODA Big-Four, came to the central arena 
when the formal ODA policymaking process started after receiving the official request from 
China. The mechanism in the second stage offered a typical example of bureaucratic 
politics pattern, and witnessed intense inter-ministerial conflicts. 
 
A policymaking process as a combination of the rational actor and bureaucratic politics 
patterns 
The analysis in this paper begins with the basic assumption of the policy approach, 
“Policies determine politics”, which means the policy issues would determine what actors 
participate the policymaking process and the relations between them. This paper argues 
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that, different from the usual ODA policymaking, the policymaking of Japan’s first 
governmental loan to China belongs to the non-routine category. The particularity derived 
not only from the large amount of new yen loan disbursement which was not able to be 
settled within the bureaucratic level, but also from the strong political significance to both 
Japan and China, and the impact on Japan’s foreign relations with other countries, given 
the new Cold War situation in the late 1970s. 
Toward the end of the 1970s, the American wish to gain a “swing” position was gradually 
eroded due to Soviet adventurism in the Third World, and the increasing sense of 
frustration and doubt about the effectiveness of the detente scheme. As the United States 
set out to normalize diplomatic relations with China under the Carter administration, the 
US priority shifted to alignment with China in confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
Against this backdrop, the United States was willing to see Japan provide economic 
assistance to support China’s new modernization policy strategically, though with some 
reservation economically. The basic stance of Japanese diplomacy in the 1970s was to 
retain its diplomatic autonomy free from the logic of strategic rivalries among China, the 
United States and the Soviet Union. But the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty 
with China in fact showed Japan’s tilt to China in the balance between China and the 
Soviet Union. Therefore, during the yen loan policymaking process, the Japanese 
government had to be cautious not to further provoke the Soviet Union. 
No matter what other policy objectives the Japanese government wanted to achieve, this 
paper shows that the governmental loan issue emerged from the bilateral trade problems 
and the Zaikai leaders became the initiators. Due to the rapid trade increase in 1978 after 
the signing of Long-Term Trade Agreement and China’s policy readjustment, the financial 
settlement problem, as was illustrated by postponing implementation of Baoshan Steel 
Corporation Project and other projects, pushed Zaikai leaders to urge the government to 
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consider a governmental loan as a measure to solve the bottleneck in bilateral economic 
exchange. 
The dominant force in the first stage was a small group of key figures from LDP and the 
government. These figures included Prime Minister Ohira, LDP PARC President Komoto, 
and Foreign Minister Sonoda. Though not directly participating the policymaking, JCEA 
President Inayama and Keidanren President Doko also proved to be important in pushing 
the political leaders to favorably consider the yen loan issue. The bureaucratic institutions 
played a role in providing necessary information, but even this function was limited, as 
most of the information exchanges were conducted during visits of high-level leaders of the 
two countries. Though some opposition opinions emerged around the problems of China’s 
policy readjustment, China-Vietnam military clash or relations with the Soviet Union, they 
either faded away with the settlement of the problems or were not strong enough to 
challenge the mainstream of the LDP-government. The policymaking mechanism was quite 
flexible. The decision to provide the governmental loan was based on an informal 
agreement between Prime Minister Ohira and LDP PARC President Komoto. 
After receiving the official request from China, the relevant ministries began their 
coordination to work out the government plan. MITI and MOFA framed their own drafts to 
compete for the final plan, while other ministries also cast substantial influences. Though 
some compromises were achieved, the inter-ministerial coordination came to face a 
stalemate on problems of package pledge, untied-ness, and hospital construction. In the 
final stage, Prime Minister Ohira’s direction proved to be decisive. Two factors might have 
promoted the Prime Minister’s readiness to make a prompt intervention. One was the weak 
political groundwork of the second Ohira cabinet established after a LDP defeat in the 
national election; the other was Prime Minister Ohira’s urgent China-visit schedule and the 
governmental loan was expected to be an impressive “Omiyage”. 
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Therefore, the whole policymaking process was completed with the politicians and 
bureaucrats playing the major roles respectively at different stages, which I would call as a 
two-stage process with a combination of rational actor and bureaucratic politics patterns. 
 
Different roles of external pressure 
The concept of external pressure in this paper is explained in a broad sense. That means 
it not only refers to the pressure from foreign countries, but also other influences external 
to the formal decision-making mechanism, such as public opinion and the influence from 
the economic community. As far as the policymaking process of the first yen loan to China 
was concerned, the external pressure primarily meant the influences from Zaikai and from 
relevant foreign countries. Due to the different decision patterns in the two stages, the 
external pressure also played distinct roles. 
Zaikai’s function proved to be quite substantial at the first stage. Zaikai initiated the 
governmental loan issue and successfully pushed the government to realize the economic 
assistance to China. Moreover, Zaikai’s function was also manifested on the Chinese side. It 
not only introduced the information about Japan’s ODA to China, but also proved to be 
influential in China’s efforts to change foreign capital policy. But its influence was of less 
significance in the second stage, during which Zaikai’s requirement of providing tied loans 
was not satisfied. This contrast shows that Zaikai’s role was still rather limited in the 
government’s foreign policymaking. Its validity depended much on its requirement being 
consistent to, or at least not colliding with, the government’s political judgment. 
In the rational actor paradigm, the external pressure was taken as one factor in the 
LDP-government’s comprehensive calculation. The complicated US attitude on Japan’s 
economic assistance to China (strategically supportive but economically conservative), the 
ASEAN concern, and the Soviet unhappiness led to the establishment of the Three 
 210
Principles on economic cooperation with China. In the second stage, however, the outside 
pressure was not only the factor the government had to respond to, but also a kind of power 
the individual ministries could utilize, which meant transgovernmental relations were 
aroused. Regarding the government plan, MOFA and MITI held opposite views on the 
tied-ness issue. The US pressure on untied loans was then utilized by MOFA to strengthen 
its position against MITI and other ministries, while MITI was backed up by Zaikai who 
strongly request the adoption of tied-ness principle.  
External pressure is more likely to be effective when there exists a domestic ally in the 
bureaucratic political process, where the pressure is easy to be translated. The pressure 
from the Soviet Union was not as efficient as that from the United States, since the latter 
was supported by MOFA while the former lacked a counterpart. Some LDP members 
employed Soviet pressure to sustain their “cautious” opinion, but their support turned out 
to be more a form than a substance. 
 
Beginning of governmental loan: a reciprocal cooperation 
Despite the lack of detailed scholarly analysis of Japan’s development aid to China, 
various observations have been made, especially about the reasons for the initial decision to 
begin the aid program. According to one Japanese China analyst, Japan started to direct 
ODA to China in 1979 “because of Beijing’s request to Tokyo for financial assistance” to 
carry out its economic development policy.1 An American specialist on China claims, on the 
other hand, that the Japanese decision was less altruistic because Japan first provided 
ODA to China because it had no option but to give financial help “in order to salvage 
                                                  
1 Kokubun Ryosei, specialist on Chinese politics, professor at Keio University, cited by 
Takamine Tsukasa, Japan's Development Aid to China: the Long-running Foreign Policy of 
Engagement, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p.4. 
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Japanese plant projects” in China,2 most of which were under threat of suspension or 
cancellation at that time. The analysis of the policymaking process of Japan’s first 
governmental loan to China in this paper reveals the diversified policy objectives that the 
Japanese government wanted to achieve. 
The Japanese government’s decision to provide the governmental loan in fact was made 
before receiving the official request from China and the policy objectives must lie 
somewhere else besides the pure economic motivation. It is important to acknowledge three 
specific background factors unique to Japan and China. The first is the new cold war 
situation in the late 1970s when the United States favored alignment with China to 
balance the Soviet Union, during which Japan tried to keep its equal-distance diplomacy 
between China and the Soviet Union. The second is China’s geographical proximity, which 
is a fundamental cause of Japan’s security concerns in terms of both military and political 
stability. The third is the complementary nature of the economies of the two countries, 
capital and technology rich in Japan and raw materials and labor rich in China, which 
determines Japan’s economic interests in China. The founding of this paper is that any 
single line of interpretation is insufficient to explain the aims of Japan’s first China ODA 
and the motivation behind it in a comprehensive manner. The policy objectives of Japan 
combined economic, strategic and psychological factors. 
The policymaking shows that the beginning of the yen loan provision was a typical 
example of reciprocal cooperation between Japan and China. On the Chinese side, the 
introduction of Japan’s governmental loan lessened the situation of foreign exchange 
deficiency and paved the way for export-related infrastructure construction, which bore 
substantial significance in terms of China’s national budget. Beginning with the yen loan 
introduction, China then received economic assistance from several other developed 
                                                  
2 Allen S. Whiting, China eyes Japan, University of California Press, CA, 1989, p.123. 
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countries and international financial organizations. The economic assistance was surely 
beneficial for the stabilization of the pragmatic regime which advocated for the reform and 
open-door route. On the Japanese side, while supporting China’s overall economic 
development, the Japanese government had also promoted the incorporation of the Chinese 
economy into the global economic system. Most of the ODA funds went to industrial 
infrastructure development in China and, in return, this infrastructure contributed 
significantly to ensuring a stable supply of Chinese oil and coal for Japan. Moreover, the 
ODA cooperation had contributed to an increase in bilateral trade and the flow of FDI and 
an advantageous position in China market for Japan. 
The policymaking process discussed in this paper shows the active political judgment of 
the Japanese government. This bears special significance in Japan’s postwar diplomacy in 
general. Since the end of Second World War, Japan’s diplomacy had been, relations with the 
United Stated taken aside, characterized as “post-war management” until the 1970s. 
“Post-war management” diplomacy was primarily concerned with diplomatic 
normalizations with foreign countries and negotiations about war compensation. A series of 
important diplomatic issues after the signing of San Francisco Treaty, such as normalization 
of relations with the Soviet Union, reparation negotiations with Southeast Asian countries,  
and diplomatic normalization with the Republic of Korea and China, were all associated 
with this post-war management. The Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and 
China represented the last post-war event and marked the beginning of a new stage  in 
the development of Japan’s diplomacy.3 Even though during the negotiation process the 
Japanese decision makers tried to take it as a simple issue among other post-war 
managements, the de facto result exceeded that scope and possessed “strategic” significance 
                                                  
3 Tanaka Akihiko, Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990 (Japan-China Relations 1945-1990), Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppan-kai, Tokyo, 1991, p.110. 
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as was showed in the debate about “anti-hegemony” article. At least from the perspective of 
neighboring countries, Japan chose to side with China in the antagonism between China 
and the Soviet Union. 
However, as can be seen from the policymaking process, Japan’s decision to provide a 
governmental loan to China was primarily the result of active political judgment based its 
own interest calculation, though the implication of post-war management could not be 
excluded completely. The word we need to pay attention to here is “active political” 
judgment. Of course all foreign policy is a political judgment; however, in contrast to those 
post-war managements which took diplomatic normalization as their main purpose, the 
policymaking we analyzed here was a process during which the Japanese government 
actively chose the instrument it considered appropriate to gain its ends.  
 
Applicability of the two-stage framework 
In this paper, the two-stage framework based on the policy approach gave an 
interpretation of policymaking process of Japan’s first governmental loan to China. As the 
precedent and usual procedure were established, and also because of the continuity of 
projects construction, the later policymaking of ODA to China tended to become more 
routinized. Beginning from 1979, Japan provided four loan packages to China: the first yen 
loan package (1979-1984), the second yen loan package (1985-1989), the third yen loan 
package (1990-1995), and the fourth yen loan package (1996-2000). As one MOFA official 
said, after the decision to issue the first yen loan, “the policymaking and the aid plan were 
primarily worked out within relevant ministries, especially Economic Cooperation Bureau 
and China Division of MOFA.”4 That means the policymaking of ODA to China returned to 
                                                  
4 Interview, Mr. Todoriki, MOFA official in charge of ODA affairs with China in Japanese 
Embassy at Beijing, Beijing, Japanese Embassy, 27 April 2006. 
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the sovereignty of the bureaucratic institutions, as most of Japan’s ODA policies do. 
However, the late 1990s, against the backdrop of China’s economic development and the 
long-term recession in Japan, ODA to China began to arouse much public attention and 
became a very controversial topic in Japan. As China ODA policy has become a public issue 
it is now difficult for the politicians, especially the LDP parliamentarians, to ignore it. A 
series of changes in Japanese politics also contributed to the LDP’s growing attention to 
China ODA policy. 
The first change was the introduction of a new electoral system in 1994, which changed 
the electoral system for the powerful Lower House of the Diet from multi-member 
constituency seats to a combination of single-member constituency seats (shosenkyoku sei) 
and seats elected by proportional representation (hireidaihyo sei).5 Since each district 
elects only one representative, LDP candidates do not compete against each other in the 
same electoral districts, but instead compete against other parties’ candidates. As a result, 
Japanese elections have become more policy oriented rather than personality and network 
oriented.6 This change has encouraged LDP parliamentarians to become involved in foreign 
and foreign aid policies associated with major public debates, including the China ODA 
policymaking. 
The second change was the strengthening of the LDP’s foreign aid policymaking 
capabilities. As Inoguchi and Iwai point out, unlike in the industrial and agricultural 
policymaking area where large numbers of LDP parliamentarians formed tribes (Zoku) in 
order to influence the policymaking process, in the foreign policymaking area, zoku were 
                                                  
5 The system elects 300 out of a total of 500 House of Representative seats by single-member, 
first-past-the post election, and the other 200 seats from 11 regional constituencies by 
proportional representation. Stockwin, J.A.A., Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major 
Economy, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999, p.83. 
6 Takamine Tsukasa, Japan's Development Aid to China: the Long-running Foreign Policy of 
Engagement, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p.81. 
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not formed before the late 1980s at the earliest. 7  This new situation promoted the 
formation of the diplomatic tribe within the LDP and that has given its members particular 
prominence in the Japanese foreign policymaking process. 
The third change was the administrative reforms carried out in the 1980s and 1990s 
which weakened the overwhelming policymaking power of central ministries, and 
simplified, in particular, the mechanism underlying bureaucratic ODA decision-making.8 
As a result, LDP intervention in the relevant ministries’ China ODA policymaking has 
become easier.9 
The introduction of a new electoral system, the LDP’s strengthened foreign policymaking 
capability, and the implementation of administrative reforms, triggered and facilitated a 
shift in the balance of China ODA policymaking power from the ministries to the LDP. The 
politicians are now more involved in the aid policymaking, giving political direction and 
exerting influences and leaving the relevant ministries to work out the specific government 
plans. Then the two-stage framework used in this paper seems to be applicable to the 
present ODA policymaking system in Japan. But different from the first yen loan where 
only a small group of top leaders were involved, attention to new participation variables of 
more politicians and more public opinion is indispensable. 
The argument of this paper is about the foreign aid policymaking. How is the 
policy-approach based framework applicable to the analysis of Japan’s foreign 
policymaking in general? There are some scholars who have made the similar efforts. For 
example, Fukui Haruhiro analyzed the Japanese government’s policymaking on Okinawa 
                                                  
7 Inogochi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, Zoku Giin no Kenkyu: Jiminto o Gyujiru Shuyaku Tachi 
(Research on Zoku Parliamentarians: the Tribe which Dominates LDP Governments), Nihon 
Keizai Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1987, p.134. 
8 Takamine Tsukasa, Japan's Development Aid to China: the Long-running Foreign Policy of 
Engagement, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p.85. 
9 For more details about the administrative reforms, see Takamine Tsukasa, Japan's 
Development Aid to China: the Long-running Foreign Policy of Engagement, Routledge, 
London and New York, 2006, pp.86-87. 
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reversion based on the division of policy issues and the labor division between the 
politicians and bureaucrats.10 Nakamura Akio explained Japan’s management of Japan-US 
trade frictions by dividing the policymaking process into three stages, each with different 
actors playing the dominant role and with different mechanisms.11 But the applicability of 
the framework needs further examination and this will be the focus of my future work. 
                                                  
10 Fukui Haruhiro, “Henkan Kosho: Nihon Seifu ni okeru Kettei Katei (Reversion Negotiations: 
the Policymaking Process within the Japanese Government)”, in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 
ed., Okinawa Henkan Kosho no Seiji Katei (The Political Process of Okinawa Reversion), 
Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1974, pp.98-101. 
11 Nakamura Akio, Nihon Seiji no Seisaku Katei (Policy Process of Japan's Politics), Ashi-Shobo, 
Tokyo, 1996, pp.177-200. 
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